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Articles

DEFENDING JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A
REPLY
Larry Alexander*
Frederick Schauer**
In On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 1 we put
forth and defended the position that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution should be taken by all other officials, judicial and non-judicial, as having an authoritative status
equivalent to the Constitution itself. We argued, to ~ut it
starkly, that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is" may
well be bad jurisprudence because it is incomprehensible as an
attempt to explain what it means to argue to the Supreme
Court, 3 but that it is nonetheless a desirable attitude for nonjudicial officials to have towards the Court and its product, in
much the same way, but far less controversially, that it is a desirable attitude for lower court judges to have towards the Court
and its opinions. 4

Warren Distinguished Professor of L·tw, University of San Diego School of
Law.
•• Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Academic Dean, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. An earlier version of this Essay
was presented on February 18, 1999, as the James A. Moffett Lecture in Ethics at Princeton University.
I, Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Excrajudicial Conscicuciona/ lmerprecacion, 110 Harv. L Rev. 1359 (1997).
2. Charles E. Hughes, Addresses and Papers 139-41 (Knickcrbacker Press, 1908).
3. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 36-37 (Belknap Press, 1986); H.LA. Hart,
The Concept of Law 124-54 (2d ed. 1994).
4. Sec Evan H. Caminker, Why Muse Inferior Courrs Obey Superior Court Precedems?, 46 Stan. L Rev. 817 (1994); Evan H. Caminker, Precedem and Prediccion: The
Forward-Looking Aspeccs of Inferior Courr Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L Rev. I (1994);
Frederick Schauer, Precedem, 39 Stan. L Rev. 571 (1987).
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This position, commonly associated with the Supreme
Court's opinions in Cooper v. Aaron, 5 and, more recently, in City
of Boerne v. Flores, 6 has long been subject to withering criticism.
Some of this criticism has come from academics, 7 but even more
has come from officials of the executive and legislative branches
of government who see little reason to take their own interpretations of the Constitution as being subject to override or nullification just because of a prior claim by a branch of governmentthe judiciary- that is given no interpretative priority in the constitutional text itself. 8 The raw assertion of judicial supremacy in
the task of interpreting the Constitution, so the critics of Cooper
and City of Boerne have insisted, is unsupported by history, un5. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
6. 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997) ("When the political branches of the Government act
against the backg.ound of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it
must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed."). In important respects, City of Boerne presents a problem orthogonal to the one that is our primary concern, both here and in our
earlier Article. City of Boerne is about the circumstances under which Congress, acting
pursuant to its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, might depart from Supreme Court precedent in exercising those powers. The existence of the § 5 power
makes the question one of substantive interpretation rather than one of obedience, although our arguments for stability and settlement might properly be understood as in
some tension with the strong exercise of congressional power under § 5. Were the § 5
power a potentially limited one, this would be of limited moment. But as long as a vast
range of potential congressional action can potentially be shoe-horned into the § 5
power, then it follows that our arguments provide substantial support for at least as much
of the City of Boerne outcome as rejects the use by Congress of the § 5 power to directly
repudiate what the Supreme Court has already determined. Although Justice Kennedy
did say in City of Boerne that Congress "has not just the right but the duty to make its
own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution," 521 U.S. at 535,
it is this statement and not the outcome that is the troubling part of the opinion. To us,
Justice Kennedy was merely being polite to Congress, telling a judicial social lie equivalent to complimenting losing counsel on the quality of her argument.
7. See e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 27-53 (Princeton U. Press,
1988); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 Hast. Const. L.Q. 359 (1997); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This
Time?, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1071 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 163 (1997); Robert F.
Nagel, Name-Calling and the Clear Error Rule, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 193 (1993); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is,
83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994); Mark Tushnet, The Constitution Outside the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 437 (1992).
8. Among the most prominent of modern statements to this effect is Edwin Meese
III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979 (1987). A substantially identical position, however, undergirded Abraham Lincoln's refusal to take the Dred Scou decision
(Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)) as universally binding. Roy P.
Basler, ed., 3 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 1-76, 102-86,207-325 (Rutgers U.
Press, 1953). And of course the same view generated a large part of the ·•nullification"
position that produced Cooper itself. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the
Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387.
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supported by the structure of our own constitutional system, and
unsupported by persuasive normative arguments of political
9
theory or institutional design.
That Cooper and City of Boerne announce the supremacy of
the Supreme Court and its interpretations of the Constitution is
largely beside the point, for the Supreme Court's bald assertion
of its own interpretive supremacy begs the question whether
other branches and other officials, to say nothing of the fublic at
large, should accept the consequences of that assertion.' Nevertheless, and without relying on the bootstrapping argument that
the Supreme Court's assertion of its own supremacy establishes
that supremacy, we argued that a central moral function of law is
to settle what ought to be done. A constitution, because of the
difficulty of altering it, attempts to effect a more permanent settlement of what ought to be done than do statutes and common
law decisions. Where the meaning of a legal settlement, including a constitutional one, is itself controverted, it is a central
moral function of judicial interpretation to settle the meaning of
that (attempted) settlement. The undeniable fact that a judicial
interpretation of an attempted legal settlement may be incorrect
does not and should not call into question its authority, for it is
inherent in all legal settlements of what ought to be done that
such settlements claim authority even if those subject to them
believe the settlements to be morally and legally mistaken.''
Moreover, the authority of a mistaken second-order settlement
of the meaning of a first-order settlement of some moral question is less problematic than the authority of the first-order settlement itself. So if we expect people to obey the Constitution

9. For a recapitulation of the debate, and an argument for a narrow reading of
what Cooper stands for, sec Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American ConstilUtional Law 254-58
(Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2000).
I 0. See Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The Execwive Power of Constitutional Imerpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1293-94 (1996).
II. To say that settlements claim authority is to say that they purport to provide
content-independent reasons for action, that is, reasons that arc independent of the
moral or interpretive correctness of the settlements. Typically, but not exclusively, content-independent reasons for action, such as the reasons to follow rules and the reasons
to follow precedent. are a function of the balance of errors committed ova time by subjects' taking the settlements as conclusive of what ought to be done as compared to those
same subjects acting on their independent substantive and content-based judgments in
each case. On this conception of authority generally, sec H.L.A. Hart, Commands and
Authoritative Legal Reasons, in Essays on Bemham: Swdies in Jurisprudence and Political
Theory 243-68 (Clarendon Press, 1982); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on
Law and Morality (Clarendon Press, 1979); Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A
Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 128-34
(Clarendon Press, 1991 ).
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even when they morally disagree with it, we can, for the same
reasons but at one remove, expect them to obey the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution even when they believe that interpretation to be erroneous.
Perhaps gratifyingly, our article has in the past three years
become the target for many of those who take the central claims
of Cooper and City of Boerne, and the claims of judicial interpretive supremacy more generally, to be misguided. In half a dozen
extended published responses, 12 and additional commentary contained in less targeted books and articles, 13 we have been seen as
ahistorical defenders of Supreme Court arrogance, and equally
ahistorical denigrators of the constitutional interpretive capabilities of Congress and the executive branch. To our critics, our
claims of judicial supremacy represent ignorance of history, bad
constitutional law, misguided institutional design, and impoverished democratic theory.
These criticisms have been thoughtful and troubling, but
our aim here is not to engage in the kind of acrimonious debates
between critics and "misunderstood" authors that one normally
associates with the letters section of the New York Review of
Books. Rather, we take the existence of this volume of criticism
as an occasion for joining issue, and continuing a debate that
goes to the central questions of the role of a constitution and the
role of the courts in a democratic society.

12. See Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability,
84 Va. L. Rev. 83 (1998); Edward Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123 (1999); Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settlement Function, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 849 (1998); Bruce G. Peabody, Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a New Agenda for Research, 16
Const. Comm. 63 (1999); Emily Sherwin, Ducking Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander
and Schauer, 15 Const. Comm. 65 (1998); Mark Tushnct, Two Versions of Judicial Supremacy, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 945 (1998); see also John Harrison, Coordination, the
Constitution, and the Binding Effect of Judicial Opinions, University of Virginia School of
Law Working Papers.
13. Sec Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 27-29 (Princeton U. Press, 1999); William G. Buss, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Demise
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 391, 429-31 (1998); Joel K.
Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Reflections, 43 St. L.
L.J. 791, 818-19, 833-35 (1999); Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline Question, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 865,903-05 (1998).
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I. THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION
A. THE PRECONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTION

An essential preliminary is to consider the nature of the
question we are asking when we ask whether the Supreme Court
should be the supreme interpreter of the Constitution, its interpretations consequently binding on others even when their own
interpretations strike them as better than the Supreme Court's.
Even before we ask what the question is, we must ask what kind
of question it is we are asking.
We frame the preliminary question in this way to make
clear that we are not asking a question that can be answered
from the Constitution itself. John Harrison, Edward Hartnett,
Neal Devins, and Louis Fisher all devote considerable attention
to the way in which we have ignored the non-designation of the
Supreme Court as supreme interpreter in the Constitution itself
as a dispositive datum, and have ignored as well the constitutional history explaining and supporting the view that the Constitution does not and was not intended to grant the Supreme
Court supreme interpretive power over the Constitution's
terms. 14
We accept for the sake of argument (and also because we
have no reason to doubt it) the rich historical evidence that Harrison, Hartnett, Devins, and Fisher have adduced. We thus accept that the Framers did not intend the Supreme Court to be
the Constitution's supreme interpreter, that the ratifiers in the
states did not understand the Supreme Court to be the Constitution's supreme interpreter, and that the text does not designate
the Supreme Court as the Constitution's supreme interpreter.
Consequently, we accept that such a role for the Supreme Court
cannot itself be based on the Constitution textually or historically understood. Indeed, we shall go even further and assume,
for the sake of argument, that the Constitution actually repudiates such a role. But we nevertheless maintain that our argument is not simply one about hypothetical systems, but one that
pertains to this Constitution in this constitutional system.
We are able to make this claim, even with the assumptions
we accept, because we are arguing for a preconstitutional norm,
14. Devins and Fisher, 84 Va. L. Rev. at 85-90 (cited in note 12); Harrison, Coordination, the Constitution, and the Binding Effect of Judicial Opinions at 12-20 (cited in
note 12); Hartnett, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 120-36 (cited in note 12).
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a norm that determines not what was adopted then, but how
what was adopted then should be regarded now. The Constitution's authority-its status as fundamental law-ultimately rests
not on facts about the past, but on the Constitution's acceptance
as authoritative in the present. This is a logical and not a historical point, and it is a logical point that undergirds our entire approach.15
To explain this point, which has eluded our more historically oriented critics, let us suppose, counterfactually, that the
Constitution did purport to answer the question of interpretive
supremacy. That is, suppose that Article VI's Supremacy Clause
did not say simply and inscrutably that "This Constitution ...
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in Every
State shall be bound thereby ... ," but instead provided that
"This Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of the Land, and
the interpretations of this Constitution by the Supreme Court of
the United States shall be final and binding on all other judges of
the United States, on all Judges in the several States, on all Officials of the Executive and Legislative Branches of this Government, and on all Officials of each of the several States."
Even were this to be the actual text of the Constitution, the
question of judicial supremacy would still remain open. Even
were this the constitutional text, there would still be the question
of who would interpret this provision, and whether that interpretation would be binding on others. Whether one puts this in
terms of the Wittgensteinian commonplace that rules do not determine their own application, 16 or instead in terms of a Kelsenian grundnorm 17 or H. L.A. Hart's ultimate rule of recogni15. For a fuller t:xploration of this idea in a widt:r range of contt:xts, set: Frank I.
Michclman, Comtiwtional Authorship by the People, 74 Notre Damt: L. Rev. 1605
(1999).
16. To usc Wittgcnstcin"s useful metaphor, when we see a sign that is an arrow, how
do we know whether to go in the direction of the point or in the direction of the tail?
Ludwig Wittgenstcin, Philosophical Investigations 'I 85 (Macmillan, 3d cd. G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1958); Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary
Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations" 33-34 (Basil Blackwell, 2d ed. 1969). For an
application of these themes to various jurisprudential questions, see Dennis M. Patterson, ed., Wiugenstein and Legal Theory (Westview Press, 1992).
17. According to Kclsen, a constitution "is grounded as valid by the presupposed
basic norm." Hans Kelsen, The Function of a Comtitution (lain Stewart trans.), in Richard Tur and William Twining cds., Essays on Kelsen 109, 119 (Clarendon Press, 1986).
On the grundnorm more generally, sec Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 3-23 (Max
Kinght trans., 1967); George C. Christie, The Notion of Validity in Modem Jurisprudence,
48 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1964); J.W. Harris, When and Why does the Grundnorm Change?,
29 Cam b. L.J. 103 (1971 ); 1ulius Stont:, Mystery and Mystique in the Basic Norm, 26 Mod.
L. Rev. 34 (1963). Sec also Michelman, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1611-19 (cited in note
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tion, 18 the central point is that the status of a legal text cannot ultimately, and cannot without infinite regress, be determined by
that text itself. In order to determine a text's status we must go
outside it. And because the text cannot answer the question of
whether the text is authoritative, neither can it answer the question whether someone's interpretation of that text, including that
part of the text that purports to designate an authoritative interpreter, is authoritative.
In many respects this point is more formal than real, at least
as applied to our fictional text. The formal logical point we
make would also apply to the question whether the word "two"
in Article III, section 3, providing that "[n]o person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court," 19 should in
that context refer to the number 3 and not to the number 2. In a
strictly logical sense, we could understand "two" to refer to 3, for
the text itself cannot determine whether for the purposes of that
text it shall be understood as ordinary English, in which "two"
stands for 2, or as Conglish, say, in which "two" stands for 3. 20
No degree of textual specificity, therefore, can hope to avoid the
logical necessity of leaving the text in order to establish the principles of that text's interpretation. Nevertheless, we might say
that understanding the Constitution as ordinary English is itself
a firmly entrenched and widely accepted preconstitutional understanding, such that interpreting "two" to mean 3 would violate one of the most firmly established of preconstitutional rules.
Yet even on our fictional example, the point is more real
than it may at first appear. Interpreting the constitutional text as
ordinary English turns out not to be as clear a preconstitutional
rule as we might have supposed, for there are parts of our actual
constitutional text that have been interpreted in plainly countertextual ways, as with, for example, interpreting "another State"
in the Eleventh Amendment to include the same state, 21 and
perhaps, at least according to Justice Stevens, as with the provi15) (discussing American constitutional context).
18. Hart, The Concept of Law at 100-23 (cited in note 3). For application of the
idea to the American Constitution and irs foundations, see Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of
Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1987).
19. U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 3, cl. I.
20. The example is a variation on themes most famously developed in Saul A.
Kripkc, Wiugenstein on Rules and Private Language 7-54 (Harvard U. Press, 1982).
21. Sec Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890). For discussion, see Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh
Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989).
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sion prohibiting states from "impairing the Obligation of Contracts."22 Consequently, since such generally accepted textual
affronts (or judicial amendments) have been understood to be
consistent with the persistence of the remainder of the text itself,23 it would not be illogical for our fictional textual provision
to be interpreted as supporting less judicial interpretive supremacy than the plain language of that text appears to indicate. And
if such a textual modification, as with the textual modification of
the Eleventh Amendment, would be logically and empirically
consistent with the persistence of the balance of the text of the
Constitution, it becomes clear that even textual clarity does not
preclude a position at odds with what the provision appears to
say, and thus leaves open the extra-textual question of whether
the fictional text should be interpreted as it reads, or instead
should be interpreted to allow more interpretive power to bodies
other than the Supreme Court. What counts as law is determined extra-legally, and what counts as the constitution is determined extra-constitutionally, and so the question whether
something derogating from what the text appears to say is nevertheless to be considered as legally valid is not a question that can
be answered by a recursive reference to the text itself.
Once we comprehend this point in the extreme context of
the fictional provision set out above, then the a fortiori argument
with respect to the actual text becomes apparent. If even such a
clear designation of judicial supremacy would leave logically
open the question of judicial supremacy, then the question of judicial supremacy is most certainly an open question on the Constitution we actually have, one in which neither the power of judicial review itself4 nor the question of the judiciary's
interpretive authority are addressed at all. On the Constitution
we do have, the question of who should interpret it, and the
status others should grant to those interpretations, remains stunningly open.
The foregoing explains why we refer to the question we ask
as preconstitutional, in the logical rather than the temporal
22. "Unlike other provisions, ... it is well settled that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is not to be read literally." Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,502 (1987).
23. To put it differently, no one understands these contradictions of the text as repealing or even replacing the entire Constitution of which the judicially repealed provisions arc a part.
24. Sec John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 Va. L. Rev. 333 (1998); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
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sense. 25 Questions of how we are to read the constitutional text
loom outside of and are therefore logically antecedent to the
constitutional text, for these are questions that in the final analysis determine what the text is to mean. Indeed, because the preconstitutional questions are essential for constituting not only a
nation but also a constitution, there is an important sense in
which the preconstitutional questions are constitutive and thus
constitutional. To understand the capital "C" Constitution, we
must first, and even more importantly, understand the small "c"
constitution on whose foundation the capital "C" Constitution
rests. 26 And because the question of whose interpretations of
the text are to be taken as authoritative is especially important
with respect to a text that is both old and often linguistically indeterminate, the preconstitutional question of interpretive supremacy strikes us, and indeed many others, as being the most
important of a larger array of preconstitutional questions.
It is for these reasons that we take the illuminating historical
and textual analyses of Devins, Fisher, Hartnett, and Harrison to
be far less conclusive than they take them to be. The question of
how we are to ground the Constitution is preconstitutional and
extraconstitutional, and so the question of how we are to understand the Constitution is likewise preconstitutional and extraconstitutional. Our inquiry into whose interpretations, if anyone's, of the Constitution are to be regarded as authoritative and
supreme is just this kind of preconstitutional and extraconstitutional inquiry, and thus a historical or textual focus strikes us as
missing the point. If when asked why we drive in the direction of
the tip of the arrow and not the tail we were to respond that the
arrow tells us to go in the direction of its tip, we would be rightfully accused of failing to understand the conditions, external to
the arrow itself, that enable us to understand what the arrow
means. Similarly, to say that we should look conclusively to the
Constitution's text and history to determine what that text and
history are to tell us is to make the same conceptual error. Our
inquiry is into the conditions that determine what the Constitution is to be understood as meaning, and it will be of no help to
presuppose a meaning as a way of answering the question of
what the meaning is.
25. Sec RichardS. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 187 (IY81).
26. Sec Michclman, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. at llil7-18 (cited in note.: 15); Frederick
Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitlllion, in Sanford Levinson, cd., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 145
(1995).
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B. THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY

Devins, Fisher, Hartnett, and Harrison show that not everyone agrees with us about the preconstitutional nature of the inquiry, but the more substantial disagreement comes once we
turn to the nature of the analysis, or the nature of the evidence,
that we would use to answer the preconstitutional question
about interpretive supremacy. Once we put aside the unhelpfully self-referencing possibility that we should look to the Constitution itself, where should we look for guidance in answering
the question about interpretive authority?
Perhaps too casually, we announced in On Extrajudicial
Constitution Interpretation that our inquiry and analysis was
"neither empirical nor historical." 27 Although accurate as a description of what we were doing, in the sense of focusing on logical and philosophical questions of institutional design, the claim
has puzzled many of our critics, who ask, rightfully, whether the
inquiry can be as non-empirical as we claimed it was. Upon further thought, it is clear to us that the empirical dimension is one
that cannot be avoided. Moreover, there is no reason why history might not be one, although only one, component of such an
empirical inquiry. This does not change the nature of our claim
or the evidence we would use, then and now, to support it, but it
does lead us to regret the language we used to describe it, and to
regret suggesting that questions of institutional design can be answered in an empirical vacuum.
In describing the inquiry as non-historical, we meant to
claim, and still mean to claim, that reliance on the authority of
history to answer the preconstitutional question has the same
status as relying on the constitutional text, and is thus ultimately
question-begging. Suppose we were to discover that all fifty-five
members of the constitutional convention, as well as a majority
of all of the legislatures of the ratifying states, had understood
the actual language of Articles III and VI as referring to interpretive exclusivity and interpretive supremacy on the part of the
Supreme Court of the United States. In that case, it would be
safe to say that James Madison and his compatriots agreed with
our claim, but we would nevertheless expressly forego reliance
on the proposition that what Madison thought settles the question.

27.

Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1369 (cited in note 1).
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That what Madison and others thought does not settle the
question is premised, again, on the problem of self-reference.
Suppose, to vary slightly an example that one of us has used previously,28 that we were to write a constitution establishing usLarry Alexander and Fred Schauer-as its supreme interpreters,
and suppose we were to provide in this document that it would
become valid and effective upon our signing of it 29 and upon notice of that signing appearing, as it now is with these very words,
in Constitutional Commentary. Under these circumstances, our
constitution's own internally specified conditions for its validity
would have been satisfied, and thus our constitution's own claim
to be the Constitution of the United States would be valid according to the conditions contained within the document.
As should be clear, however, the satisfaction of the document's internal and self-specified conditions for its own validity
would be woefully inadequate to establish the document as the
Constitution of the United States. And that is because a constitution's status as the constitution is dependent upon its (empirical) acceptance by a polity as their constitution. Without this
empirical acceptance-acceptance as social fact-no amount of
formal internal validity will make a document a constitution.
What follows from this is that what makes James Madison's
constitution and not Alexander and Schauer's constitution the
Constitution of the United States is not something that is contained in the document, and not something that could have been
determined in 1787, but is rather something that is determined
now by the American people. Without the social fact of acceptance by the American people in 2000 that the document that
Madison and his compatriots wrote in 1787 is the Constitution of
the United States, that document is no more authoritative than
the constitution that we purported to make effective on the
pages of this volume.
If what makes the 1787 Constitution the 2000 Constitution
is dependent on 2000 social facts, then so is the 2000 status of
what James Madison and the other framers intended in 1787 dependent on a 2000 decision and not on a 1787 decision. The
relevance of history is not determined historically, but by a present political and social decision. As a consequence, the determination of 1787 preconstitutional questions is necessarily a non28.

Schauer, Amending the Presuppositiom of a Constitwion at 146-47 (citt.:d in nott.:

29.

Wt.: signed it.

26).
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historical question, although it is of course possible that the nonhistorical question might be answered by giving a role to history.
This is the sense in which we claimed that our inquiry was
not historical. What Madison thought about the question of judicial supremacy, if indeed he thought about it at all, is no more
dispositive than what the text says about judicial supremacy, for
the point about preconstitutionality is as germane to the question of the authority of history as it is to the authority of the text.
Thus, our argument is that the Cooper rule is normatively superior to what we tendentiously call institutional anarchy. If the
original Constitution lacks the Cooper rule, then our claim is
that the original Constitution is normatively inferior to a constitution that contains the Cooper rule. We could, of course, obtain
the Cooper rule by amending the Constitution through the formal processes it prescribes in Article V. But that is not what we
are advocating. Rather, we are advocating that we obtain the
Cooper rule (or recognize the existence and validity of the Cooper rule) in the same way that we have obtained the original
Constitution itself, namely, by accepting it as authoritative. In
Cooper, the Supreme Court ran that rule up the flagpole. If we
like it, all we have to do is salute. And it appears that most of us
have in fact done so. And if that is so, then that makes the Cooper rule as "constitutional" as the Constitution itself.
But if we step back a bit and address the question whether
we as a society ought to salute-to extend our metaphor perhaps
beyond the breaking point-then we admit that we were perhaps
too quick in dismissing the value of history. That history is not
authoritative does not make it non-authoritatively irrelevant.
Madison and the other framers were smart fellows, and we have
much to learn from them, just as we have much to learn from
Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Abraham Lincoln, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, John Rawls, and Frederick Douglass. And we have much to learn from the history of
the United States, just as we have much, in the United States, to
learn from the history of France, Japan, India, Brazil, and South
Africa. But the central point is that what we learn from history
we learn because of its content and not because of its authority.
That Madison said something ought to be relevant to our inquiry, but it does not come close to settling the question.
Because our preconstitutional question is a question of
normative institutional design-of what institutional designs
ought to be adopted-it would be a mistake to suppose that we
could or should engage in this inquiry without reference to facts
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about the world. To claim that our inquiry is not empirical was
also then and is now a mistake. Rather, the proper claim is that
the status of the question- its preconstitutional nature- is itself
a logical and not a historical or empirical matter. But once the
status of the question is established, and we are then trying to
determine whether this or that institutional design is better, it
would be folly to ignore the evidence that we might obtain from
the external world, including evidence that we might get from
history. While inferring that certain sorts of behavior would
likely flow from certain incentives and systemic designs is entirely appropriate, we recognize that we should never lose sight
of the fact that these are empirical inferences, and thus usefully
supplemented by and tested against actual evidence of actual
behavior, whether that evidence be historical, sociological, statistical, psychological, or otherwise.
II. THE SETTLEMENT FUNCTION AND ITS OPTIMAL
LOCATION
A. IS SEITLEMENT OVERRATED?

Once we turn from meta-questions about the nature of the
question to the question itself, we arrive at our claim that one of
the chief functions of law in general, and constitutional law in
particular, is to provide a degree of coordinated settlement for
settlement's sake of what is to be done. In a world of moral and
political disagreement, law can often provide a settlement of
these disagreements, a settlement neither final nor conclusive,
but nevertheless authoritative and thus providing for those in
first-order disagreement a second-order resolution of that disagreement that will make it possible for decision to be made, actions to be coordinated, and life to go on.
But what is so special about settlement? Here our critics
come in two varieties. Some, especially Mark Tushnet but most
of the others as well, and indeed a vast tradition surrounding
them, 30 sees an independent virtue in public constitutional dis30. In describing a huge modern tradition advocating connecting American constitutional law with an argued desirable public discourse (or dialogue, or deliberation, or
conversation) about constitutional matters, we could reference literally thousands of
books and articles. Among the more prominent or exemplary arc Bruce Ackerman, We
the People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 1991); Levinson, Constitutional Faith (cited in
note 7); Cass R. Sunstcin, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1993); Robert
Justin Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Without Tails: Pragmatism and the Art of
Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 69 (1991); Frank I. Michelman, The Su-
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course, and thus sees a virtue in the kind of discourse that will
never come to pass without some degree of continuous public
dispute and debate about constitutional meaning. For an entire
contemporary movement stressing the Constitution as a forum
and a focal point for public deliberation, a cardinal virtue of the
Constitution is that it provides the locus for desirable public debate about crime control, affirmative action, gender equality,
sexual orientation, devolution of authority to the states, presidential conduct, the role of religion in public life, and innumerable other topics that combine undeniable public interest and
importance with a plain connection to the kinds of topics that
the Constitution designates as fundamental. And if we overly
stress the settlement function of the Constitution, so the argument appears to go, we truncate precisely the public debate and
deliberation that lies, or should lie, at the heart of the constitutional tradition.
We demur. Although we do not deny 31 the virtues of public
discourse, it strikes us as the conceit of American constitutionalists to think that Americans need the Constitution in order to
debate affirmative action, criminal justice, abortion, religion and
the state, privacy, or capital punishment. These debates have
flourished in countries in which there is no single written constitutional document (primarily Great Britain, New Zealand, and
Israel), 32 and they have flourished in countries in which the written constitutions have not constitutionalized these particular
topics. 33 Although it would take serious comparative deliberative research, using various dimensions of constitutionalism as
variables, to answer this question with any authority, and although such research does not yet exist, it appears to us far from
certain that a constitution is either a necessary or a sufficient
condition, or even a significant causal contributor, to fruitful
public debate about matters of great political and moral moment.
To put the point differently, our argument is premised not
on the assumptions that agreement is better than disagreement,
preme Court. 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Governmelll, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4
(1986); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1987).
31. At least here. Sec Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1309 (1997).
32. See generally S.E. Finer, Vernon Bogdanor, and Bernard Rudden, Comparing
Constitutions (1995); Vicki C. Jackson and Mark Tushnct, Comparative Constitutional
Law (Foundation Press, 1999).
33. Sec JohnS. Bell, French Constitutional Law (Clarendon Pn.:ss, 1992).
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or that settlement is better than keeping things open, even
though both of these are plausible world-views. Rather, our argument is premised on the special functions that law serves, and
that agreement and settlement appear to be the peculiar and
special province of law, and the peculiar and special province of
constitutions that have been written down and understood in
substantially law-like ways. There are other forms of discoursefocusing public documents, but our argument is premised on
there being something important about the difference between
the American Constitution and the writings of Confucius or
Chairman Mao (to take two prominent examples of discoursefocusing non-legal documents), and about the difference between the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. 34
Moreover, although constitutions typically deal with matters
of greater moral moment than determining whether people
should drive on the right or on the left, to take the classic example of law's coordinating function, the value of settlement for
settlement's sake is hardly absent from the functions of a constitution. Although people could well have serious moral and political disagreements about whether to have proportional or
"first past the post" representation, about whether there should
be an established state religion, about whether there should be
trial by jury in civil (or criminal) cases, about whether criminal
defendants should be compelled (upon pain of punishment for
contempt of court, or a permissible inference of guilt to testify),
or about whether Presidents should serve as many four-year
terms as the electorate is willing to permit, all of these areas of
plausible political and moral disagreement are pretty much settled in the American constitutional text, thus taking them off the
agenda, even for those who disagree with the substance of the
settlement. The authority of law, when it is taken to be authoritative, provides, for those who disagree with the terms of the settlement, content-independent reason for obeying the terms of

34. We intentionally usc the latter example because Mark Tushnet, especially in
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (cited in note 13), makes
special reference to the Preamble to the Constitution and to the Declaration of Independence, notoriously non-legal documents, as for him the desirable focal points for public discourse about foundational values. The examples he wisely picks are consistent with
a non-legal focus on constitutionalism, but for us the question remains about whether it is
wise or useful to contlate the question of public debate about matters of great importance with the question of constitutionalism. If the two arc the same, then Tushnct is
right and we arc wrong. If the two arc different, then the difference must lie somewhere
outside of the realm of public discourse, and instead in the realm of constraints on that
discourse, or constraints on the products of that discourse.
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the settlement even when they disagree with their substance. 35
If, as Justice Brandeis claimed, "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right, " 36 the settlement qua settlement serves important
social functions. And as the examples we just gave illustrate, the
value of settlement for settlement's sake is hardly absent from
the realm of constitutional settlements. Although the argument
has been made that the stability wrought by strong ~recedential
constraint is less important in constitutional context, 7 the text of
the Constitution itself is strong testimony for Brandeis's view,
and for the proposition that the constraints of settlement for settlement's sake are often thought, and were thought by the Constitution's drafters, to be more valuable than the value that
comes from greater flexibility in the face of changing facts about
the world, and changing views about how we wish to confront
those facts.
The examples we have just used, of course, represent a biased sample, for they are all examples in which the constitutional
text makes moderately clear what the settlement is. With a text
as indeterminate as the American Constitution, however, it is far
more common to find disputes with a constitutional dimension in
which the text itself provides no settlement for that dispute.
Does the establishment clause prohibit teacher-organized nondenominational prayer in the public schools 38 or student-led
non-denominational prayer at public school graduations? 39
Does the equal protection clause prohibit states from maintain35. We do not know what to make of Edward Hartnett's claim that we arc in some
way against disagreement, and that urging obedience is tantamount to condemning disagreement. Hartnett, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 152-60 (cited in note 12). Nagel also suggests
the same thing, although more obliquely. Nagel, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 660 (cited in
note 12). Perhaps we encouraged their misunderstanding by using the ambiguous words
"without regard." Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1380 (cited in note 1).
Yet just as we can drive at 55 miles per hour while loudly and publicly condemning any
speed limit below 70, so too can public disagreement with the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution be understood as entirely compatible with obedience to those
interpretations unless and until the Court changes its mind.
36. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); sec also Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Yes. 481, 497, 32 Eng. Rep. 441, 447 (1803)
("better the Law should be certain, than that every Judge should speculate upon improvements").
.
37. Sec Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Payne~·. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,828 (1991); Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis:
Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 401 (1988).
See generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedellt, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
38. Sec Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Abington Sch. Disc. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
39. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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ing single-sex colleges and universities? 40 Does the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement prohibit use at trial of pro41
bative evidence obtained without a warrant?
Does the free
speech clause encompass speech explicitly encouraging racial
violence? 42 Is capital punishment cruel and unusual, and thus
violative of the Eighth Amendment? 43 In the absence of explicit
congressional action, may states impose regulations that impose
44
a financial or logistical burden on interstate commerce?
Do
the exigencies of modern legislative practice allow Congress t~
delegate legislative responsibilities to administrative agencies, 4 '
or to truncate the formal process of two-house approval and presentment to the President? 46
In these and countless other instances, there exists in the
United States plausible moral and political disagreement and the
absence of a clear textual settlement. In place of this textual settlement, however, we have Supreme Court opinions attempting
to resolve the issue, but whose resolutions certainly do not
eliminate the underlying disagreement. In such cases, our central claim is that the value of settlement for settlement's sake is
such that bodies other than the Supreme Court, especially lower
courts, state legislatures, Congress, and the President, ought to
take the resolution as authoritative even as these bodies continue to disagree with the substance of the resolution. By recognizing the authority and thus the interpretive supremacy of the
Supreme Court, we argue, these other bodies will contribute to
stability and social harmony in just the same way that they do
when they recognize the authoritative and supremacy of the constitutional text itself. If Bill Clinton recognizes the value of settlement in deferring to the authority of the Twenty-Second
Amendment in refusing to run for a third term, then so too, we
argue, should he recognize the value of settlement in refusing to
sign, for example, a Communications Decency Act explicitly
contravening a recent and unanimous Supreme Court interpretation of the First Amendment. 47 If the argument from settlement
40. Sec Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); United Stales v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
41. Sec Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. Sec Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
43. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
44. Sec Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
45. Sec Mistreua v. United Stales, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); American Textile Mfrs. Inst.
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
46. Sec INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
47. Compare Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), with Sable Communicalions v.
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fails, then it is hard to explain most of the Constitution. But if
the argument from settlement succeeds, then it is an argument
that supports the existence of a single authoritative interpreter
as strongly as it supports a single authoritative Constitution.
Although Tushnet takes the strongest position against treating law-based settlement as a transcendent value, 48 Bruce Peabody also takes us to task for overemphasizing it. 49 And although Peabody acknowledges some of our qualifications, he
still insists that our celebration of settlement and stability slights
numerous other important values, some of which are substantive
and some of which are procedural, and which include such worthy goals as creativity and the need to retain flexibility in order
to be able to rapidly accommodate to a changing world. 50
Implicit in our argument, however, is something we should
make explicit-we do not believe that law, or courts, or constitutions, are or should be the repositories for all that is good in institutional design. Just as we ought not to design the brakes on a
car in order to maximize speed, acceleration, or ease of steering,
even as we recognize these other goals as relevant, so too do we
rely on the proposition that law-based institutions serve stability
and settlement fostering functions more than do other social institutions, and that that is not necessarily a bad way to think
about the separation of functions in a complex and differentiated
FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
48. Tushnet, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 952-57 (cited in note 12).
49. Pt:abody, 16 Const. Comm. at 68-69 (cited in note 12).
50. Peabody also takes us to task for overemphasizing the virtues of obedience to
the wrong rule, even as Sherwin, 15 Cons!. Comm. at 68-71 (cited in note 12), chastises us
for shying away from our conclusion and treating judicial decisions as a factor and nothing stronger. Sherman does not have problems with our defense of Cooper. Her cavil is
with our attempt to reconcile that defense with what we say about Lincoln's obligation to
obev the command of the Court in Dred Scott. We argue that Lincoln was, or at least
couid have been, right to disobey the Court, and that this concession docs not undermine
our defense of Cooper. But Sherwin argues that we are then in effect only urging a consideration in favor of obedience, and not a real rule, and that only a real rule can provide
the settlement benefits of stability, reliability, and coordination. But although we agree
with Sherwin about the necessity of a strong rule, we believe she underestimates the
asymmetric nature of authority. The position of the authority and that of the agent subject to that authority arc different. An authority's rules claim absolute obedience, and
not mere consideration. They demand that the subject obey even if the subject is convinced that the balance of reasons, including the reasons to have the rule and its settlement benefits, favors disobedience. The subject, however, faced with an authoritative
rule, cannot alienate her rationality and moral agency, even if the overall results would
be better if agents were to do so. There is thus always a gap between the concept of what
the authority is right to command and what the subject is right to do. As a result, there
appears to be no inconsistency in saying that the Court, from its perspective, was right to
demand obedience from Lincoln, and that Lincoln, from his, was morally right to disobey.
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society. So when we claim that settlement for settlement's sake
is the special brief of the law, we do not claim, and should not be
understood as claiming, that all social institutions have the same
brief as does the law, or that settlement should loom as large in
the pantheon of social values as it properly does in that subset of
society we call the law. To see judicial supremacy in settlement
terms, as we do, is thus to see constitutional law as serving an essentially stabilizing and constraining function. Were stability
and constraint not preeminent among constitutional values, we
wonder why it is seen as important in the first instance to impose
second-order constitutional constraints on first-order political
decisions. But if stability and constraint are central to explaining
constitutionalism itself, then the argument for a single authoritative interpreter is an argument that flows directly from the deepest values of constitutionalism.
B. ARE COURTS THE BEST SETTLERS?

Although Tushnet and Peabody challenge the value we
place on settlement for settlement's sake, the complaint that
joins all of our critics except Sherwin is that we leap too quickly
from the premise that settlement for settlement's sake is a good
thing to the conclusion that the courts in general, or the Supreme
Court in particular, are the best institutions to serve that function. Settlement may be a good thing, these critics admit, and
settlement may even require a single authoritative interpreter,
but why does it follow that the assignment should be given to the
Supreme Court rather than to some other institution?
The argument comes in two forms. One stresses dialogue
between the Supreme Court and Congress and between the Supreme Court and the executive branch. Devins and Fisher in
particular offer a defense of a temporary form of what we dismiss as "institutional anarchy," arguing that a much more complex give and take between the Court and the political branches
than Cooper allows is a good thing. Such institutional anarchy
produces better constitutional decisions in the long run, they argue, and thus to increased political stability as a consequence.
We have not performed the full social science examination
that would be required to address this thesis fully, and thus we
cannot gainsay the Devins and Fisher thesis directly. To the extent that they are making the point that all authority rests fragilely on acceptance by its subjects, and that the contentindependent reasons that authority provides are themselves frag-
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ile because they are deeply paradoxical, then we agree with
them. 51
If, however, Devins and Fisher are arguing that constitutional issues should not be settled authoritatively because to do
so risks undermining the very acceptance upon which authority
rests, then we must take issue. The public can and often does
accept authoritative settlements, including constitutional ones,
with which it vigorously disagrees both in terms of morality and
policy and in terms of interpretation of text. For example, neither the early New Deal decisions by the Supreme Court invalidatin.p federal legislation attempting to stem the Great Depression5· nor the Warren Court decision invalidating school
prayers 53 were widely viewed as lacking authority, even though
both were extremely unpopular substantively and widely criticized as interpretively erroneous. Authority may rest upon
nothing more secure than moment to moment acceptance by
those subject to it, but for various reasons this acceptance can
weather a considerable amount of deep disagreement over both
policy and interpretation. And insofar as the acceptance of the
judicial role and the esteem of the judiciary itself may rest more
on the substance of its decisions than anything else, 54 then it may
also be the case that little in the structure of the Court's role will
have a great effect on its degree of acceptance and legitimacy.
It is also important to distinguish among various kinds of
constitutional disagreements. When the disagreement is merely
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of a constitutional rule
and not with the substantive result, where people believe that
the Supreme Court's constitutional rule is superior to the actual
rule adopted by the framers, 55 then the case for Cooper is strong51. Indeed, one of us has stressed this on numerous occasions. See Larry Alexander, Can Law Survive the Asymmetry of Authority?, in Linda Meyer, cd., Rules and Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer (Hart Publishing, 1999); Larry Alexander and
Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1191 (1994); Larry
Alexander, The Gap, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 695 (1991); Larry Alexander, Law and
Exclusionary Reasons, 18 Phil. Topics 5 (1990).
52. E.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
53. See supra note 39.
54. See David Adamany and Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as a
National Policymaker, 5 Law & Pol'y Q. 405 (1983); Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the
Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, SO Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 1209 (1986); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird, On
the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 343 (1998).
55. It may also be important not to overemphasize what the people know or believe
about Supreme Court decisions. Cf. Timothy R. Johnson and Andrew D. Martin, The
Public's Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 299
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strongest. This is not to say that the Court should not attempt to
interpret the Constitution faithfully, even when it believes the
Constitution to be sub-optimal or even mischievous as a matter
of morality or policy. It is merely to point out that when the
stakes consist only of the correctness of an interpretation of an
earlier settlement, the value of settlement appears to outweigh
the value of interpretive correctness.
In cases in which a Supreme Court interpretation is believed
by the political branches to be not only incorrect but also iniquitous or bad policy, should settlement then take a back seat to
substantive correctness? From the standpoint of institutional
design, which is the standpoint that pervades our project, we
continue to believe that the answer is "no." Many, perhaps
most, constitutional issues touch on matters of substantive importance, so that practically all interpretive disagreements with
the Court will be accompanied by policy disagreements. That
means that without authoritative settlement, most constitutional
issues will remain open in the sense that any governmental actor
who disagrees with a Supreme Court constitutional decision will
feel free, legally and morally even if not always politically or
prudentially, to ignore that decision. The police officer who disagrees with the prevailing state of Fourth Amendment warrant
law will likely bypass seeking a warrant if he believes he might
achieve his ends in doing so; and his chances of doing so will be
enhanced if, for example, lower court judges are under no legal
obligation to follow Supreme Court decisions with which they
disagree. So too with state legislatures that would prefer organized prayer in the public schools, municipalities that seek to
regulate indecency as well as obscenity, and the panoply of executive officials who might wish to use their powers to discourage women from having abortions.
Perhaps because of examples like these, none of our critics 56
take the position that lower courts need not follow the Supreme
57
Court, nor even the position, central to Attorney General
Meese's claim a dozen years ago, 58 that the states, whether in

(1998) (salience of Supreme Court activity declines substantially after first decision on
highly visible issue).
56. With the possible exception of Hartnctt-scc Part III infra.
57. Sec John M. Rogers. Lower Court Application of the "Overruling Law" of
Higher Courts, I Legal Theory 179 (1995); cf. Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 155.
58. Meese, 61 Tulane L. Rev. at 985-86 (cited in note 8); sec also Symposium, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 977 (1987).
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their executive, legislative, law enforcement, or judicial capacities, were free to take Supreme Court decisions as being limited
to the case in which they arose, and thus not setting out law for
other actors. That our critics are unwilling to come out strongly
in support of dispersal of the interpretive authority among the 50
states suggests that the debate is narrower than might at first appear, and that our arguments for national interpretive supremacy of the national constitution is well-accepted. Still, Devins
and Fisher, Nagel, Peabody, and Tushnet all argue that the need
for authoritative settlement does not dictate which institution
should possess that authority. A democratically constituted
body can settle constitutional issues, they argue, and thus for
some or many issues Congress might be superior to a court in
performing the settlement function.
One reason for believing that the Supreme Court rather
than Congress or the Executive is the best institution to wield
the settlement authority, however, is the Court's relative insulation from political winds, a clear virtue unless one holds the view
that constitutional interpretation is and should be no more than
the expression of contemporary values and policies. And although Nagel, especially, charges us with exaggerating the degree of Supreme Court stability, 59 the question of stability can
only be determined by a function that takes into account both
the frequency and the degree of variability. Just as house current that moves constantly in a range between 108 and 112 volts
is for most purposes more stable than current that is between
109.9 and 110.1 six days out of seven and either 62 or 154 on the
seventh day, so too is it a mistake to focus on Supreme Court instability without examining the range within which the Supreme
Court is unstable as compared to the range within which the
other branches would be unstable. And if Supreme Court instability takes place frequently but within a narrow range, 60 it is a
mistake to focus only on the number of changes in Supreme
Court doctrine, as Nagel appears to do, without careful examination of the range of this variation compared to the range of
variation for the other branches.
Our suspicion, which admittedly would be better bolstered
by the kind of careful controlled examination that neither we nor
our critics have yet performed, is consistent with the view that
59. Nagel, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 857-60 (cited in note 12).
60. See Vincent Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't
(Yale U. Press, 1983).
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the Court's adherence to precedent 61 allows it to settle constitutional issues more permanently than can the political branches,
which have no practice analogous to precedential constraint.
But even if t~e b~st institutiona~ design would exemgt the Court
from the obhgatwn to follow tts own precedents, - the Court
would still be superior to the political branches as the institution
to exercise the settlement authority. There are established and
constraining procedures through which constitutional issues are
brought before the court, but no comparable procedures exist
for bringing such issues before the political branches. The Court
issues opinions along with its decisions, but the political branches
do not (although they could). The Court has only nine members, and they serve for life. The Court cannot pick its agenda,
although Congress can. Whether in the final empirical analysis
these and other features make the Court more stable than Congress or more stable than the executive branch is more of an empirical question than we first acknowledged, but in default of the

61. See Antonin Scalia, A Mauer of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 13839 (Princeton U. Press, 1997); Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law at 82-85 (cited in
note 9); Henry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. 723 (1988).
62. Should the Supreme Court itself be subject to the Cooper rule'' Put differently,
should a decision by the Court that it now believes to be mistaken nonetheless be taken
as having permanently settled the issue'1 How strong a doctrine of horizontal precedent
should apply to the Court's constitutional decisions''
There are three principal positions one can take on this matter. First, one can argue
that the Cooper rule should apply full force to the Court itself. Once the Court decides a
constitutional matter, it is settled for all time. No matter how mistaken a constitutional
interpretation the Court now believes its earlier decision to have been, and no matter
how mischievous or iniquitous, the earlier decision is as authoritative as the Constitution
for the Court as well as all other officials.
The second position is at the opposite end of the spectrum. The Court might be the
one institution exempt from the Cooper rule. If it believes an earlier constitutional
precedent to have been mistaken, it is free to overrule it.
The third position would allow the Court to overrule precedents only if the precedents were both erroneous as constitutional interpretations and, in the Court's opinion,
unjust or mischievous. In other words, constitutional error would be a necessary but not
sufficient ground for overruling precedent.
The first position exalts settlement over all opposing values. The Court gets one
shot at correctly interpreting particular constitutional provisions. The only cure for Supreme Court error would be the lengthy and difficult course of constitutional amendment.
The second position, however, does not prize settlement enough. We are attracted,
therefore, to some variant of the third position, which gives the Court a safety valve
against harmful constitutional errors. Of course, the third position has its downsides.
Unlike the other positions, in which the Court must follow the Framers or follow its prior
decisions attempting to follow the Framers, the third position requires the Court to make
first-order judgments of morality and policy. Moreover, it sacrifices somc settlement
value and also allows some constitutional error. For these reasons, our endorsement of
the third position is less than wholehearted and quite tentative.
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kind of non-anecdotal evidence that would approach settlement
of this question, we remain unpersuaded that, if settlement is a
substantial goal, that we will get more settlement for settlement's
sake from Congress than we will get from the Supreme Court.
III. WHAT IS THE SUPREME COURT FOR?
Undergirding many of the criticisms is a vision of the Supreme Court as a case-decider and not a law-maker. This vision,
consistent with a classical view about the functions of the courts
but not necessarily invalid because of that provenance, is most
explicit in Hartnett's critique, for to him what courts do is decide
specific cases. 63 All the rest, including the opinions, is gravy.
For Hartnett the decision of cases, and not the giving of opinions, is at the core of the judicial function, and since our whole
position rests on the way in which opinions might be thought to
give some guidance, it rests on a misunderstanding, he argues, of
the nature of adjudication. And, Hartnett supports his view with
an impressive demonstration of the historical view that the Supreme Court was from the founding conceived as a case-decider
and not as a law-maker or opinion-giver.
We will not dispute Hartnett's history, but as with Devins
and Fisher's history, we have a different view about the status of
that history. So if we take the history as interesting but not determinative, we might then ask about what vision of what the
Court should be doing is most consistent with our view of the
settlement function. And here we admit that we do not find it
irrelevant that last year the Supreme Court carefully considered,
by its own definition of careful consideration implicitly built into
the certiorari process and procedures, only 94 cases, as compared
with the 7015 it was asked to carefully consider, but chose not
to. 64 If the Supreme Court is primarily a case-decider and only
secondarily, at best, an opinion purveyor, it _appears to have
achieved a level of inefficiency unmatched in any other govern-

63. Sec Hartnett, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 126-36, 146-58 (cited in note 12). A similar
claim makes a brief appearance in Devins and Fisher, 84 Va. L. Rev. at 91 (cited in note
12). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to
Professor Paulsen, 83 Geo. L.J. 347,349 (1994) (federal courts decide cases and do not
expound the law); Thomas Merrill, Judicial OpinioiiS as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 43 (1993); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the
Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1006 (1965) (Supreme Court functions stem from
its responsibility to decide concrete cases).
64. The Supreme Court, 1998 Term - The Statistics, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 400, 407
(1999).
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ment agency we know of. 65 If the Supreme Court processes only
1% of its caseload in order that it might make good decisions in
that 1%, and in order that it might surround those decisions with
opinions that, according to Hartnett and others, do not much
matter, the time has come for major reconsideration of the
Court's role and its methods of operation.
Such reconsideration might be in order, we believe, but not
because the Court is doing too much opinion-writing. On the
contrary, on our view it is not doing enough, or it is not doing it
well enough. 66 The vision of the Court as constitutional interpreter, which is our vision, as opposed to the vision of the Court
as dispute settler, which is Hartnett's, is a vision that sees the
Court being much more concerned with instructing, guiding,
helping, and, indeed, ordering other bodies and other branches
67
than the volume and style of its current output would suggest.
And if these are or should be the Court's concerns, then we
would expect to see more clear rules, fewer divided judgments
without a majority opinion, more concern by the Justices for the
Court speaking with a single voice than with making their own
points or even with insisting on their own view about the outcome,68 even more concern with stare decisis, and in general
more Supreme Court behavior befitting the law-maker that the
Supreme Court undeniably is, and in our judgment inevitably
must be. The strongest argument for Hartnett's position is not
65. Samuel Estreichcr and John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme
Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681 (1984), argue that
the Supreme Court should sec itself more than it docs as a manager of a system of courts.
We do not disagree with this, but offer the more radical proposal that the Court should
also see itself as a manager of constitutional signals and a manager of a system of constitutional compliance.
66. Sec Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802,
807-11 (1982); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1455 (1995).
67. Our view is largely consistent with that in David G. Post and Steven C. Salop,
Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers
and Others, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1069 (1996). See also Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence
G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(1993); David G. Post and Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of
Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 Geo. L.J. 743 (1992). On these and related issues, see
generally Evan H. Caminkcr, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember
Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297 (1999).
68. Sec John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Re·
sponse to Some Radical Proposals, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (1996); John M. Rogers, "I Vote
This Way Because I'm Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L.J. 439
(1990). In ultimately agreeing with our position about Cooper, Suzanna Sherry takes our
position, correctly, as suggesting that individual Justices of the Court should take themselves in many contexts (such as that presented in City of Boerne) as being as bound by
the Court's decisions as they expect other officials to be. Sherry, 39 Wm & Mary L. Rev.
at 904 (cited in note 13).
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his historical analysis, which again we believe correct but largely
beside the point. Rather, it is the nature of the Court's current
performance as rule-maker. If the authoritative interpretation
of authoritative rules is a rule-making function, which we believe
it is, then much of the Court's methods of operation would need
to be revamped. 69 In that sense, Hartnett's most persuasive
claim, even if not one he makes explicitly, is that under his vision
the Court can proceed as it is now, and under our vision it needs
to spend much more time thinking about how it can give better
guidance to Congress, to the executive, to lower courts, and to
the states. 70
We have dismissed as being no more relevant than original
intent the Court's own assertions of its own interpretive supremacy, arguing that this form of bootstrapping could not answer the
question of whether the Court's assertions of interpretive supremacy should be respected by other branches, and supported
by extra-judicial political incentives. 71 But in another sense the
Court's own assertions are highly relevant. If the Court itself
purports to be a guider of other officials and other branches,
which is what its own statements in Cooper and City of Boerne
appear to assert, then the Court's performance may properly be

69. We do not accept Hartnett's view that the courts "have little business decreeing" rules. Hartnett, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 149 (cited in note 12). Nor do we agree with
him that an opinion (a reason) cannot be followed. As a statement of what should happen in a class of cases, of which the instant case is one, a reason is essentially a rule, sec
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633 (1995), and can be followed just
as a rule can be followed. "I hold in your favor because people have a right to protest in
public parks" is a reason, but it is also a rule that protesting in public parks must be permitted. For us, the Supreme Court decrees rules whenever it gives a reason for its decision, and thus whenever it writes an opinion. To suggest that the Court should get out of
this business is truly the radical approach, and our more modest suggestion is only that
the Court acknowledge the rule-making in which it is inevitably engaged, as a first step
towards doing better what it is now doing, and has been doing for centuries.
70. This might also be an argument, were we starting anew, for a much less opaque
constitutional text. Although the new 114-page Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa and the new 211-page Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil might be
extreme examples, it is instructive that in all of the constitution-making now going on
throughout the world, no nation has chosen a written constitution anywhere as brief and
cryptic as that of the Constitution of the United States. Much of this is likely due to the
fact that the Constitution of the United States was made in secret and most modern ones,
and especially the two we just noted, were made under very public conditions in which
the political incentives favored wholesale inclusion of a wide variety of rights, interests,
and values. But part of it may also be due to an increased recognition that if a Constitution is to serve as law, then it should come as no surprise that it will look like law as well.
71. Such as political liabilities for elected officials who disregarded even unpopular
Supreme Court decisions, liabilities that plainly do not exist in the current political environment in which elected officials and their subordinates operate.
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measured against its own announced statement of its function. 72
And by the definition of the function that it has announced and
we, here and earlier, have supported, the Court plainly has a
long way to go.
It may appear that imagining this role for the Court runs
afoul of the prohibition on advisory opinions, 73 but if the ban on
advisory opinions were understood as preventing useful statements about the law unnecessary to the result in the case the
Court would do nothing except announce judgments, possiblyand only possibly-coupled with a statement of the facts of the
case. Once the Court goes beyond this, whether we call what the
Court does giving an opinion, giving reasons, or offering dicta, it
is in the business of giving advisory opinions. There may be
good Article III reasons for prohibiting the Court from doinfi
this except in the context of a particular case or controversy,
but once a case or controversy exists it is too late in the day to
eliminate the full array of reason-giving practices in which the
Court is engaged, practices that necessarily "decide" cases other
than the one before the Court because the logical nature of a
reason makes it broader than the outcome that the reason is a
reason for. So if the Court is already and necessarily in the business of giving advice in its opinions-advisory opinions-then it
is only the smallest of steps to imagine that it could consider
more seriously than it has to date how it might perform this function more effectively.
CONCLUSION
It is fashionable to dismiss John Marshall's claim that the
province of the judiciary is "to say what the law is" 75 as typical
Marshallian hubris, 76 unnecessary to the result in Marbury, un-

72. For an important exploration of the ways in which courts might serve this function more effectively, sec Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constiwtional Flares: On Judges,
Legisla!Ures, and Dialogue, 83 Minn. L. Rev. I (1998).
73. Sec Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article Ill, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997 (1994);
Oliver P. Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 Ind. L.J. 203 (1949); Felix
Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002 (1924). A useful survey of state practices is Paul C. Clovis and Clarence M. Updegraff, Advisory Opinions, 13
Iowa L. Rev. 188 (1928).
74. See Krotoszynski, 83 Minn. L. Rev. at 19-23, 30-39 (cited in note 72); Evan T.
Lee, Deconstitutiona/izing Justiciability: The Example of Moot ness, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 605
(1992).
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,177 (1803).
76. Cf. Nagel, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 850 (cited in note 12) (describing judicial
assertions of interpretive supremacy as exercises in "self-importance").
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supported by the Constitution, and unwise as a matter of policy.
Yet if a multiplicity of bodies says what the law is, then there is
likely to be a multiplicity of laws, or, more precisely, a multiplicity of interpretations of the same law. And if, as Lon Fuller
maintained, knowing what the law is and knowing how to cornply are necessary conditions for legality itself, 77 then multifarious
law and multifarious interpretation are at odds with the rule of
law itself. Although diversity of opinion is a valuable social phenomenon, law exists primarily because diversity of opinion and
diversity of action may sometimes produce more harm than
good. When we value coordination and settlement more than
we value diversity, we employ law, and John Marshall's claim is
nothing less than the observation, later refined by Fuller, that
without a single and authoritative interpreter there would be little difference between law and the numerous non-enforced directives we find in philosophy books and advice columns.
As a judge, Marshall not surprisingly moved too quickly
from the need for a single authoritative interpreter to the claim
that the judiciary was the only institution that could serve this
role. But although there are other candidates, none of them
contain the institutional constraints that could enable them to
speak with the same degree of consistency as the Supreme
Court. As long as this is so, and there is no evidence that it is
not, 78 then it will and should be the function of the Supreme
Court to say what the law is. For those arguing to the Supreme
Court or evaluating its work, there will always remain some conceptual space between what the Supreme Court says and the law
the Court purports to interpret. For those to whom the Supreme
Court speaks, however, the functions of law have been better
served, and will be better served in the future, if the Constitution
is what the Supreme Court says it is.

77. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1969).
78. One of the most valuable products of this exchange between us and our critics,
we hope and believe, is that it has sharpened the nature of the empirical question that
lies at the center of the debate, at least at the center of the debate between us and those
who would locate in Congress the role of the single authoritative interpreter. As Peabody properly observes, Peabody, 16 Const. Comm. at 85-90 (cited in note 12), the debate may provide the springboard for the kind of serious empirical research on this question that has yet to take place.

